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In a democracy, a policy institution acquires and retains legitimacy either through the quality 
of its decision procedures or because it is able to deliver what the citizens expect. In the recent 
referendums, the French and Dutch citizens were asked to vote on a new set of rules and 
procedures. But rather than to give their opinion on the machinery, they chose to express their 
dissatisfaction with the output.   
Together with peace, prosperity remains the Union’s premier public good. From the Single 
market  to  the  euro,  many  ambitious  projects  have  been  undertaken  in  the  name  of  it. 
Expectations have been created, only to be disappointed a few years later – a sure recipe for 
frustration.  
The  referendums  thus  emphasise  that  Europe’s  poor  economic  performance  deeply 
undermines the very legitimacy of the EU – a point rightly emphasised by Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in a speech to the European Parliament on the eve of the 2005 British presidency.  
The need for a growth agenda is thus more pressing than ever. This Spring, the EU announced 
a revamped version of its growth programme, the so-called Lisbon strategy. Initially launched 
in 2000, when Europe started to realise that in spite of a favourable environment it had been 
losing ground vis-à-vis the US for a decade, the Lisbon agenda has not delivered. If anything, 
the EU’s comparative growth performance has weakened since it was adopted five years ago.  
The  European  institutions  cannot  be  accused  of  ignoring  the  evidence.  The  Kok  report 
commissioned  by  the  European  council  and  the  Commission’s  own  assessment  of  the 
economic performance of Europe are unusually frank. President Barroso’s intention to give 
growth  an  overriding  priority  is  unmistakable.  The  question,  however,  is  whether  the 
revamped  Lisbon  strategy  is  likely  to  work  better  than  the  original  one.  Lisbon  mark  2 
essentially boils down to a renewed emphasis on integration, a smaller set of objectives, and a 
streamlining  of  the  coordination  procedures  that  already  exist:  “less,  but  the  same”,  as 
observed by Collignon (2005). Hardly a revolution.  
There is wide agreement that five years after the beginning of the economic slowdown, the 
EU and especially the Eurozone cannot afford to remain  on a  sub-par growth track. The 
question is why the initial strategy has been unsuccessful and why it should now be expected 
to deliver what it has not delivered in its first five years. On this account, the conventional 
explanations, which basically put emphasis on the complexity of the initial set of objectives 
and indicators, are unconvincing. Complexity may account for implementation failures here 
and there, not for an overall lack of action.  
There is thus a need for a deeper investigation into the shortcomings of the Lisbon strategy. 
What this paper argues is that the reason for those shortcomings is a lack of incentives to 
coordinate reforms within the EU. It makes the point that the very rationale for undertaking 
reforms jointly is in fact weak for the EU as a whole while it is stronger within the Eurozone.   
                                                
1 jpf@bruegel.org. This is a revised version of a paper initially prepared for the “Munich Economic Summit”, 
June 2005. Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author. They do not represent in any way those of 
the members or the board of Bruegel.    2 
If this analysis is correct, the conclusion is that the EU must give thoughts to improving the 
incentive they face, especially within the Eurozone. It must also make better use of its own 
instruments – the EU legislation, the budget, monetary policy and the Stability pact.   
This paper starts with a short assessment of economic situation in the Union and the degree to 
which it explains the result of the referendums. Part 2 is devoted to an evaluation of the 
Lisbon strategy. Part 3 discusses why this strategy did not deliver. Recommendations for 
improving it are made in part 4. Part 5 concludes
2.  
1.  Europe’s economic and political woes  
In a recent paper, Olivier Blanchard (2004) challenged the view that Europe is sick, and 
claimed instead that its relatively low income per head reflects a preference for leisure. This 
was already a controversial reading of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Turning to the late 
1990s and the early 2000s, it can at best be regarded as paradoxical. 
Two basic facts illustrate the point. First, the EU’s economic performance has consistently 
disappointed  expectations  since  2000.  The  last  five  years  have  been  characterised  by  a 
persistent  lack  of  economic  momentum  in  the  Eurozone  and  Europe  at  large  and  by  a 
widening gap between world and European GDP growth. In comparison, Europe’s relative 
performance was markedly superior in the early 1990s in spite of the aftershock of German 
unification (Graph 1).  
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Second, the growth gap between the US and Europe cannot be ascribed anymore to an inferior 
mobilisation of labour resources. In the early 1990s, the EU could still be described as a high 
productivity  –  low  employment  economy  and  it  was  routinely  compared  to  the  low 
productivity – high employment US economy. But since the mid-1990s, Europe has started to 
catch up on employment while it has been lagging behind as regards productivity growth. 
Although the level of labour utilisation remains inferior to that in the US, the main factors 
behind the widening of the income gap are now demographics and productivity (Table 1).  
                                                
2 This paper partially draws on joint work with Philippe Aghion and Elie Cohen (2005).    3 
Instead of moving towards the frontier by improving its performance on both employment and 
productivity, the EU thus only seems to be able to trade-off productivity for employment 
while remaining at a GDP per capita level markedly inferior to that of the US (Sapir et al., 
2004). The two macroeconomic goals of Lisbon – employment and productivity – look as 
being substitutes rather than complements (CEPS, 2003).  
Table 1 : Relative US/EU15 performance 
(EU performance level as a percentage of corresponding US performance) 
 
  1995  2003 
Income per head  72.1%  70.9% 
Hourly labour productivity  93.6%  88.0% 
Employment rate  82.9%  90.4% 
Source : Eurostat, structural indicators database 
 
It is in the three main economies of the Eurozone – Germany, Italy and France – that those 
woes  are  especially  apparent.  In  France,  they  weighted  very  significantly  in  the  voters’ 
decision to reject the draft constitutional treaty: all exit polls indicated that the deteriorated 
economic and social situation had been the main motive for the no vote, over and above other 
factors such as the judgement on the constitution itself, disagreement with the prospective 
enlargement to Turkey or domestic political concerns (Graph 2)
3. The voters’ intention was 
apparently  to  sanction  the  EU  for  a  failure  to  deliver  economic  prosperity
4.  In  the 
Netherlands, the main declared motives were that the country “pays too much to the EU” and 
that it would risk having “less control over its own affairs”
5. While the difference with French 
motivation is noticeable, those results can also be regarded as indicating that the EU does not 
deliver [economic] value for [budgetary] money. Again domestic concerns and Turkey seem 
to have played a minor role.  
Graph 2:
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3 This result consistently emerges from the exit polls of CSA, IPSOS and SOFRES, in spite of varying 
formulation of the question and of varying alternative answers. It can therefore be considered robust.   
4 Although more detailed analyses indicate that opposition to the treaty among public-sector employees was a 
significant factor behind the victory of the no, they also confirm that social polarisation among the voters was 
exceptionally high (Goux and Maurin, 2005).  
5 NOS/NSS polls.    4 
One of the messages from the referendums is therefore that citizens are reluctant to approve 
the rules and procedures of a Union that does not deliver prosperity.   
2.  An assessment of the Lisbon strategy 
Is Lisbon the remedy? A prerequisite to an answer is to define what Lisbon really means. 
Putting aside an unfortunate initial hype, it can be summarised in a three-pillars programme
6: 
•  Economic integration. This is the traditional EU agenda and the one on which its 
growth strategy rested in the  1980s  and the 1990s.  Lisbon was a recognition that 
economic integration was not likely to be sufficient as an engine for growth, but it 
remains a key component of the approach. Integration today obviously does not mean 
dismantling border controls anymore, but reforming domestic regulations that obstruct 
freedom of establishment,  hinder cross-border mergers and acquisitions and stifle 
competition. This requires to combine EU and national policies, albeit in a field where 
the EU generally has precedence.  
•  A soft coordination of domestic labour markets and pension reforms. This pillar was 
added in 2000 thanks to the adoption of the “open method of coordination”, a non-
binding commitment to reciprocal consultation and benchmarking (Rodrigues, 2002). 
The goal was to complement the traditional agenda with policies aiming at increasing 
labour supply and tackling long-term unemployment. However, no legislation could 
be proposed as the EU has almost no competence for labour markets, taxation and 
social  security:  those  areas  primarily  belong  to  the  remit  of  the  member  states. 
Common  targets  were  set  instead,  together  with  supporting  league  tables  and  a 
benchmarking of policies. It was expected that this non-binding coordination would 
encourage the adoption of best practices. To that end, the Commission had to draw up 
scoreboards on the basis of commonly agreed targets and indicators.    
•  A restructuring of public spending in the direction of R&D and higher education. Here 
again, most of the means are in the hands of the member states, but the setting up of 
common objectives was expected to foster additional efforts.  
Although in this area the EU is either the player (for Eurozone monetary policy) or can rest on 
explicit coordination powers (for budgetary policies), macroeconomic policy is not part of the 
strategy as it focuses on the structural conditions for growth. Macroeconomic stability, i.e. 
budgetary discipline and price stability, is regarded as a complement to it.              
This is the programme. What are the achievements?  
On the integration front, little has changed in recent years. The one advance that can be noted 
is the implementation of the Lamfalussy programme for financial services. For other policies, 
no major push has been recorded. Aggregate evidence based on price convergence or trade 
intensity suggests that after the completion of the Single market in  1992, integration  has 
somewhat stalled (Graph 3). Compared to other regional groupings, trade within the EU-25 
evidently lacks momentum. Furthermore, more detailed research (Mayer and Zignago, 2005) 
indicates that in spite of a much more complete legislative and regulatory apparatus, EU-
induced  intra-European  trade  is  markedly  less  important  than  NAFTA-induced  North-
American trade. More than ten years after the removal of all border obstacles, the EU is still 
very far from being an integrated economy.     
                                                
6 The Sapir report (2004) and the Kok report (2004) provides more comprehensive overview of the Lisbon 
strategy. The revised version of the Lisbon strategy is presented in a Commission (2005) communication to the 
Council and the Parliament as well as in the Integrated Guidelines first adopted in 2005.     5 
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Another piece of evidence on integration is provided by the OECD (Conway et al., 2005) 
index of product market regulation (Graph 4). In spite of the Single market, there is roughly 
as much variance in the degree of product market regulation within the EU15
7 than among the 
non-EU OECD countries. Furthermore, the trend towards deregulation is similar in the two 
groups of countries. In short, there is no prima facie evidence that membership in the EU 
makes a difference as regards the nature or degree of product market regulation.   
 
Graph 4: Product Market Regulation, 1998 and 2003
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Turning to labour markets and tax or welfare reforms, the evidence does not suggest tight 
coordination either. Again, the OECD indicators (Brandt, Burniaux and Duval 2005) can be 
used to assess the degree to which the regulatory and tax regimes of labour markets have 
effectively converged within the EU and whether a common European approach emerges 
from the data.  
                                                
7 The new member states of Central and Eastern Europe have been excluded from the sample because their 
recent transition to the market economy could have affected comparisons over a 10-years period.    6 
Only  examples  can  be  given  here.  The  most  striking  regards  the  degree  of  employment 
protection for permanent workers, for which the dispersion among EU15 members is as wide 
as within the OECD and remains at the same level as ten years before. Although the issue of 
employment protection is central in a strategy that intends to equip workers for a transforming 
economy,  there  is  no  evidence  whatsoever  of  European  convergence  towards  a  common 
approach. Some more convergence can be observed in the protection of temporary workers as 
many countries have relaxed provisions regarding temporary workers, but in that case the 
dispersion regards the frequency with which companies rely on such contracts.   
Graph 5: Employment Protection for Permanent 
Workers, 1993 and 2003
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A second, equally striking example is given by the implicit taxation on work after 60. A major 
objective  of  the  Lisbon  programme  is  to  increase  the  labour  force  participation  and 
employment rates of persons between 60 et 65 years old. A major obstacle in higher senior 
participation comes from provisions in the pension and tax regimes that effectively discourage 
work after 55 or 60, frequently because additional pension contributions do not increase the 
future benefits anymore. Reducing this implicit taxation of work should thus be a common 
objective of the EU member states. Yet the dispersion of implicit taxation rates remains wider 
within the EU than among non-EU OECD countries.   
Graph 6: Implicit Tax Rate on Work After 60
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   7 
Finally, I look at the tax wedge on labour income at the bottom end of the wage distribution 
(data are again from the OECD). A number of European countries have recently introduced 
targeted cuts on social security contributions in order to “price in” unskilled labour. Graph 7 
does  confirm  that  there  is  an  observable  tendency  toward  lower  tax  wedge  among  EU 
members, however it has taken place at a very uneven pace and the dispersion has in fact 
increased rather than decreased over the 1997-2003 period.    
 
Graph 7: Tax Wedge on Labour Income 
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Although  the  evidence presented  remains  somewhat  sketchy,  it  tends  to  confirm  that  the 
Lisbon coordination of labour market policies has not strongly affected national policies.  
Finally, the restructuring in public spending is not taking place, at least it has not yet occurred. 
Aggregate figures indicate that the share of R&D in GDP has increased in Japan and the US, 
but not in Europe (Graph 8). The commitment to increase this spending to 3% of GDP has 
failed to materialise.  
Graph 8: R&D Spending / GDP
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Evidence thus supports the view that Lisbon has not fulfilled its promises. The question is, 
first, why it has not delivered, second, what can be done to make it effective.      8 
3.  Why is Lisbon not effective? 
It is hard to challenge the Lisbon goals. In fact, they command virtually universal support. 
Governments  are  committed  to  them.  The  European  parliament  supports  them  quasi-
unanimously.  Both  the  employers  federation,  UNICE,  and  the  European  Trade  Unions 
Congress, ETUC, strongly endorse them. But action does not follow words. So why is the EU 
unable to deliver on such a seemingly uncontroversial reform agenda? Why have integration 
and reform stalled? Why, finally, is Lisbon the least effective in the large Eurozone countries, 
where reform is the most pressing?  
Conventional wisdom puts the blame on complexity, i.e. on the multiplication of detailed 
targets, objectives and reporting procedures. Yet the argument places much to much faith in 
the  Lisbon process. Beyond  the  technicalities,  the  gist of  the  Lisbon agenda  is clear and 
simple – as previously emphasised. To claim that its failure stems from the complexity of the 
procedures amounts to assuming that governments have behaved in an excessively myopic 
way.  
The deeper issue is of a different nature. Rather than with complexity, the problem has to do 
with the lack of  incentives  to behave  in accordance with the prescriptions of  the  Lisbon 
strategy.  
Lisbon rests on the belief that member countries have a common interest in coordinating 
structural reform policies. The underlying rationale draws on two series of arguments. First, it 
is assumed that countries may gain from undertaking reforms jointly. Second, it is expected 
that they may learn from the experience of each-other and that the EU may help in providing 
an assessment of what works and what does not. 
The first argument rests on the existence of positive cross-border externalities from supply-
side  policies.  As  always  in  the  presence  of  such  externalities,  coordination  should  help 
internalising the benefits of reform policies and thereby lead governments to move away from 
an  inefficient  no-reform  equilibrium  to  an  efficiency-enhancing  reform  equilibrium.  The 
problem, however, is that externalities arising from supply-side policies are less evident than 
those from demand-side policies. Absent labour mobility, a country that lowers its structural 
unemployment rate does not significantly impact its neighbours. Its success fundamentally 
benefits its own citizens. Similarly, a country which succeeds in improving its productivity 
performance essentially boosts its own growth. Its neighbours may benefit from resulting 
price cuts and corresponding purchasing power increases, but this effect normally results from 
the move to a new price equilibrium and absent market failures, there is no reason to suspect 
that this cross-border spill-over reduces the incentive to improve productivity. In other words, 
externalities are pecuniary ones and are normally dealt with by the market (Tabellini and 
Wyplosz, 2004).  
There are obviously exceptions as some policies such as spending on research and higher 
education, which involve non-pecuniary externalities, gain from being coordinated. There are 
also counter-arguments
8, but on the whole, a fair assumption is that the case for coordinating 
supply-side policies must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
The second argument is based on the so-called theory of “yardstick competition” initially 
developed  in  a  regulatory  context  (Schleifer,  1985)  and  later  extended  to  analyse  the 
behaviour  of  decentralised  governments  (Besley  and  Smart,  2001).  By  providing  an 
independent assessment, the EU could help governments to sort good from bad policies and 
                                                
8 See Pisani-Ferry (2004) for a discussion of Tabellini and Wyplosz.    9 
voters to sort good from bad governments. In this way, the “open method of coordination” 
should trigger competition and foster reform.    
The problem with this argument is that in the European context, yardstick competition is a 
rather  weak  force.  Voters  may  compare  the  overall  performance  of  the  respective  EU 
countries  –  for  example  their  relative  unemployment  rates  –  but  comparing  policies  and 
reforms is much less straightforward, as the impact of any given reform depends on a host of 
other factors, from existing institutions to complementary policies and the macroeconomic 
context. A recurring theme of the literature on economic reforms is that in the presence of 
policy  complementarity,  their  effectiveness  heavily  depends  on  these  context  factors. 
Furthermore,  voters  face  difficulties  in  appreciating  the  trade-offs  involved  (for  example 
between efficiency and equity or employment and job security) as, again, this requires more 
information than the mere observation of economic results.  
Lisbon may be regarded as a supporting device to make yardstick competition more effective. 
The  provision  of  harmonised  data  and  comparative  assessments  may  trigger  a  kind  of 
performance transparency and help determining what works best – without infringing to the 
member states’ policy autonomy.  
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the adoption of the Lisbon programme has not 
significantly affected the reform debate in the larger member states such as Germany (where 
the  discussion  on  Agenda  2010  was mostly  conducted  without  reference  to it)  or  France 
(where politicians routinely warn against the devilish character of the Anglo-Saxon model). 
The paradox of Lisbon is thus that it tends to be a reference in smaller, more open and reform-
minded economies – exactly where it is hardly needed.   
Furthermore, the Commission is visibly in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis the member 
states. It has no power to enforce the Lisbon agenda and hesitates between the role of  a 
schoolmaster and that of a coach. The Barroso commission recently took some distance with 
the former role, indicating that its intention was not to designate good and bad pupils, but 
rather to support the efforts of all of them.  
Against this background, the decision by the European council of March 2005 to base the 
monitoring on “national reform programmes” geared to the member states’ “own needs and 
specific situations” (and whose preparation is the responsibility of the member states) risks 
watering down the whole exercise and may weaken even further the incentive to conform to 
the commonly agreed agenda. 
There  is  however  another  potential  motive for coordinating  reforms,  this  time  within the 
Eurozone. In a monetary union, countries that reform and, as a result, lower their structural 
unemployment  rate  or  increase  their  trend  productivity  growth  rate  exert  a  medium-term 
externality on their neighbours. Think for example of a monetary union composed of two 
countries, A that reforms and B that does not. Both obviously share the same nominal interest 
rate. Suppose that as a consequence of reforms in A, the aggregate structural unemployment 
rate goes down while aggregate productivity goes up – in both cases lowering inflation until a 
new steady-state equilibrium has been reached. The central bank can thus lower interest rates, 
thereby  boosting  domestic  demand  in  both  A  and  B.  However,  for  A  the  interest  rate 
reduction is less than it would have been with currency autonomy, while for B it entirely 
results from the partner’s policies (and can therefore result in inflationary pressures). The key 
here is that the externality is entirely attributable to the fact that the two countries share the 
same currency.   
Assume now that governments face a political economy constraint and therefore hesitate to 
undertake  reforms.  Structural  reforms  that  increase  potential  output  in  the  medium  term   10 
frequently cause output losses in the short term because they involve adjustment costs, create 
uncertainty  and  affect  consumer  behaviour  (as  illustrated  by  the  current  situation  in 
Germany)
9. A recent IMF (2004) study suggests that this kind of inter-temporal distribution 
may in fact characterise a wide array of labour market and product market reforms (Graph 9). 
In such situations, the inter-temporal gain from introducing a reform can be low or even 
negative if governments have a strong preference for the present.  
Graph 9: Intertemporal Effects of Structural Reforms 
Source: IMF (2004) 
 
More generally, reforms frequently amount to trading short-term (economic and political) 
costs for long-term (economic) gains. For that reason, politically motivated governments may 
hesitate to undertake welfare-improving reforms. This is where macroeconomic policy comes 
in. What it can do is to change the inter-temporal distribution of costs and benefits through 
speeding up convergence to the new, higher equilibrium. By taking advantage of the structural 
improvement  before  spontaneous  convergence  has  taken  place,  it  can  make  reforms  less 
costly  in  the  short  term  and  thus  more  attractive  for  politicians.  In  other  words, 
macroeconomic accommodation can be an incentive to structural reform.  
In a monetary union, however, monetary policy can only support the reform efforts of any 
given government to the extent it contributes to improving the aggregate performance. For a 
government acting in isolation, the incentive to overcome political economy constraints is 
                                                
9 Reforming employment protection can, for example, imply more unemployment in the short term (as firms 
dispose of redundant workers) but less in the long term (as flows increase and the market for labour becomes 
more fluid).   11 
reduced accordingly. Absent a coordination of structural reform efforts, this may result in a 
reform deadlock in which no government undertakes the necessary reforms
10.    
This reasoning has relevance in the Eurozone. Reform-minded governments can only rely on 
fiscal policy to the extent this does not conflict with the Stability and Growth Pact. They can 
only rely on monetary policy to the extent their reforms result in lowering the aggregate 
inflation rate. On both accounts, the macroeconomic framework does not help to overcome 
the reform deadlock.  
Summing  up, the problem  with structural reform coordination at the EU level it  that the 
rationale  for  it  is  relatively  weak  and  that  the  incentive  to  coordinate  hardly  exists.  The 
problem with coordinating structural reforms among Eurozone members is that they face a 
collective action problem that the macroeconomic framework does not help to overcome.  
This Eurozone dimension was until very recently not taken into account in the EU policy 
framework as the Lisbon agenda entirely focuses on reform coordination among the 25 and 
completely overlooks the Eurozone dimension, while the Stability pact ignored the issue of 
structural  reform  until  its  recent  reformulation  and  monetary  policy  was  not  geared  on 
supporting structural reform.  
4.  What can be done? 
To return on a higher growth path, the EU first needs to concentrate efforts and political 
energy where they can be expected to deliver growth dividends. Second, it needs to remedy 
the lack of incentives in the Lisbon programme. Third, the Eurozone needs to better combine 
structural and macroeconomic policies in a way that builds on their complementarities. 
Economic integration within the EU should be pushed further, but as a growth-enhancing 
programme  rather  than  as  an  end  in  itself.  In  an  environment  characterised  by  rising 
reluctance to governance from Brussels and a tendency to revert to the nation-state as the 
ultimate shelter against the pressures from globalisation, it is important not to confuse means 
and ends. Recent reactions to the outcome of the referendums indicate that the two majors 
achievements of the last decades, the Single market and the euro, can be openly challenged by 
senior mainstream politicians. The mere preservation of what has been achieved can therefore 
not be taken for granted.  
Against this background, the EU  should neither  promote further  market integration  in an 
indiscriminate way nor stop pushing for it. It should consciously devise a strategy to rebuild 
legitimacy through concrete achievements. This implies to focus on areas where integration 
has the potential of decisively contributing to aggregate growth and better take into account 
the balance between political costs and economic benefits.  
In other words, the EU should primarily focus on “making the Single market more dynamic” 
as proposed by the Sapir (2004) report. This means less insistence on liberalisation across the 
board and more stronger priority on areas such as competition, the long-awaited community 
patent, the completion of the Single market for financial services or the free cross-border 
provision of high-productivity services. This also means lifting the bottlenecks that prevent 
the effective integration of the new member states, which has the potential of contributing to a 
renewal of European growth and competitiveness.     
                                                
10 Other Eurozone-specific externalities exist. Another important one regards pensions. The case for coordinating 
pension reforms within the EU as a whole is not a very strong one, but it is much more compelling within the 
Eurozone because of their impact on public finance. Long-term sustainability essentially depends on the implicit 
liabilities created by the pay-as-you-go systems and for that reason, budgetary surveillance necessarily 
encompasses the issue of pension reform.   12 
Reform coordination should not be abandoned but efforts should focus on areas where it is 
justified by cross-border externalities. The European commission should continue to provide 
an uncompromising comparative assessment of performance and efforts that can be used in 
domestic policy debates and thereby trigger an informed discussion on what works and what 
does  not.  But  it  should  focus  its  positive  coordination  efforts  in  areas  where  significant 
externalities exist, such as migrations or research and higher education. In those areas, policy 
effectiveness requires joint action and EU intervention is more than legitimate.  
However, reform coordination cannot only take the form of exhortations or encouragements. 
To ensure effective coordination, words needs to be substantiated with deeds. This is why the 
Sapir report (2004) had proposed to use the EU budget as an incentive device to support 
national efforts in areas of common interest and encourage member states to undertake them 
(a good testing ground could be higher education, where member states share a common 
interest in upgrading their research universities to retain students and professor and make 
them contribute to the development of a knowledge-based economy: EU money could be used 
to  elicit  national  efforts).  The  initial  Commission  proposal  for  the  2007-2013  financial 
perspectives had partially taken this proposal on board but further negotiations in the run-up 
to the June European council led to reverting to a more traditional approach. An unambitious 
budget that neither restructured spending nor increased it in a significant way would have 
deprived  the  EU  from  a  potentially  powerful  device  to  trigger  coordination  and  increase 
incentives to pursue growth-enhancing policies. The debate over the financial perspectives 
that has started creates an opportunity for discussing options. 
Finally,  the  Eurozone  should  take  into  account  complementarity  between  structural  and 
macroeconomic  policies  and  adapt  its  policy  framework  accordingly.  The  principles 
governing macroeconomic policy in EMU are certainly not compatible with the explicit “two-
handed  approach”  advocated  two  decades  ago  by  economists  (Blanchard  and  al.,  1985). 
However, more can be done within the current framework to help overcoming the political 
economy obstacle to growth and reform.  
First, overall stabilisation can significantly be improved. Over the last cycle, the Eurozone has 
been  characterised  by  a  lack  of  responsiveness  of  monetary  policy  (combined  with 
comparatively weak transmission mechanisms) and an inappropriate stance of aggregate fiscal 
policy in the upswing. Improving stabilisation through better responsiveness would benefit in 
the short run and might even improve long-term growth (Aghion, Cohen and Pisani-Ferry 
2005). Some progress, albeit without much result so far, has been made in this direction 
through the redefinition of the ECB target and the reform of the Stability Pact.  
Second, the fiscal policy framework must encourage reforms that are conducive to growth and 
may improve the intertemporal budget balance. The agreement of March 2005 on reforming 
the SGP includes a commitment to take structural reforms into account “when defining the 
adjustment path to the medium-term objective for countries that have not yet reached this 
objective and in allowing a temporary deviation from this objective for countries that have 
already reached it”. The devil, however, is in implementation, especially as the reformed SGP 
has  moved  away  from  rules  to  rely  more  on  discretion  (Pisani-Ferry  2004b,  2005). 
Furthermore, the countries is the most urgent need for reform are also those in which the 
budgetary margins allowed by the Stability pact are exhausted. 
Third, the ECB should explicitly let known that without prejudice to price stability, it stands 
ready  to  back  reforms  that  lower  structural  unemployment  put the  Eurozone  on a  higher 
growth  path.  It  has  already  recognised  the  existence  of  complementarities  between 
macroeconomic  policies  and  structural  reforms  and  hinted  at  the  additional  room  of 
manoeuvre that the latter would create for the single monetary policy (Papademos, 2004).   13 
Time has come to go further and more unequivocally recognise that provided the governments 
act, monetary policy would support their action. Such a commitment would certainly involve 
taking a risk. The question, however, is whether it is preferable to take the alternative risk of 
remaining  in  a  deadlock  that  would  ultimately  undermine  the  sustainability  of  monetary 
union.    
5.  Conclusions 
Two decades of sub-par performance and four years of near-stagnation have resulted in a 
situation where the very legitimacy of the European Union is at stake. Failure to deliver 
growth and prosperity has already undermined support for the common institutions. It could 
tomorrow trigger a backlash against economic integration and the very achievements of the 
last  twenty  years,  the  Single  market  and  the  euro.  It  could  turn  the  potentially  highly 
beneficial integration of the new member states into a zero-sum game and spark off a range of 
intra-EU controversies.  
This paper has argued that the Lisbon programme has not delivered on its promises and that 
Lisbon  mark  2,  its  revamped  version,  is  unlikely  to  succeed  either,  because  it  fails  to 
recognise the shortcomings of its predecessor. What the EU needs is to focus integration 
efforts, to use the EU budget to support reform efforts with effective incentives rather than 
just words, and to make the macroeconomic framework more conducive to reforms.  
A  more  effective  growth  programme  has  for  a  long  time  already  been  an  economic 
imperative.  After  the  referendum,  it  has  also  become  an  even  more  pressing  political 
imperative.  
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